Paper 2011/706

Improved Side Channel Attacks on Pairing Based Cryptography

Johannes Blömer, Peter Günther, and Gennadij Liske


Techniques from pairing based cryptography (PBC) are used in an in- creasing number of cryptographic schemes. With progress regarding efficient implementations, pairings also become interesting for applications on smart cards. With these applications the question of the vulnerability to side channel attacks (SCAs) arises. Several known invasive and non-invasive attacksagainst pairing algorithms only work if the second but not if the first argument of the pairing is the secret. In this paper we extend some of these attacks also to the case where the first argument is the secret. Hence we may conclude that positioning the secret as the first argument of the pairing does not improve the security against SCAs, as it sometimes has been suggested.

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Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
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peter guenther @ uni-paderborn de
2012-01-24: revised
2011-12-27: received
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      author = {Johannes Blömer and Peter Günther and Gennadij Liske},
      title = {Improved Side Channel Attacks on Pairing Based Cryptography},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/706},
      year = {2011},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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