Paper 2011/665
Efficient Modular Exponentiation-based Puzzles for Denial-of-Service Protection
Jothi Rangasamy, Douglas Stebila, Lakshmi Kuppusamy, Colin Boyd, and Juan Gonzalez Nieto
Abstract
Client puzzles are moderately-hard cryptographic problems --- neither easy nor impossible to solve --- that can be used as a countermeasure against denial of service attacks on network protocols. Puzzles based on modular exponentiation are attractive as they provide important properties such as non-parallelisability, deterministic solving time, and linear granularity. We propose an efficient client puzzle based on modular exponentiation. Our puzzle requires only a few modular multiplications for puzzle generation and verification. For a server under denial of service attack, this is a significant improvement as the best known non-parallelisable puzzle proposed by Karame and Čapkun (ESORICS 2010) requires at least $2k$-bit modular exponentiation, where $k$ is a security parameter. We show that our puzzle satisfies the unforgeability and difficulty properties defined by Chen \etal{} (Asiacrypt 2009). We present experimental results which show that, for $1024$-bit moduli, our proposed puzzle can be up to $30 \times$ faster to verify than the Karame-Čapkun puzzle and $ 99 \times$ faster than the Rivest \etal's time-lock puzzle.
Note: to appear in ICISC 2011 proceedings
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- client puzzlestime-lock puzzlesdenial of service resistanceRSApuzzle difficulty
- Contact author(s)
- j rangasamy @ qut edu au
- History
- 2011-12-09: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/665
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/665, author = {Jothi Rangasamy and Douglas Stebila and Lakshmi Kuppusamy and Colin Boyd and Juan Gonzalez Nieto}, title = {Efficient Modular Exponentiation-based Puzzles for Denial-of-Service Protection}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/665}, year = {2011}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/665} }