Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2011/651
CHECKER: On-site checking in RFID-based supply chains
Kaoutar Elkhiyaoui and Erik-Oliver Blass and Refik Molva
Abstract: Counterfeit detection in RFID-based supply chains aims at preventing
adversaries from injecting fake products that do not meet quality
standards. This paper introduces CHECKER, a new protocol for
counterfeit detection in RFID-based supply chains through on-site
checking. While RFID-equipped products travel through the supply
chain, RFID readers can verify product genuineness by checking
the validity of the product’s path. CHECKER uses a polynomialbased
encoding to represent paths in the supply chain. Each tag T
in CHECKER stores an IND-CCA encryption of T’s identifier ID
and a signature of ID using the polynomial encoding of T’s path
as secret key. CHECKER is provably secure and privacy preserving.
An adversary can neither inject fake products into the supply
chain nor trace products. Moreover, RFID tags in CHECKER can
be cheap read/write only tags that are not required to perform any
computation. Storage requirements for a tag are low with only 120
Bytes.
Category / Keywords: RFID, counterfeit detection, privacy
Date: received 2 Dec 2011, last revised 9 May 2012
Contact author: kaoutar elkhiyaoui at eurecom fr
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20120509:092708 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2011/651
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