CHECKER: On-site checking in RFID-based supply chains

Kaoutar Elkhiyaoui; Erik-Oliver Blass; Refik Molva

Paper 2011/651

CHECKER: On-site checking in RFID-based supply chains

Kaoutar Elkhiyaoui, Erik-Oliver Blass, and Refik Molva

Abstract

Counterfeit detection in RFID-based supply chains aims at preventing adversaries from injecting fake products that do not meet quality standards. This paper introduces CHECKER, a new protocol for counterfeit detection in RFID-based supply chains through on-site checking. While RFID-equipped products travel through the supply chain, RFID readers can verify product genuineness by checking the validity of the product’s path. CHECKER uses a polynomialbased encoding to represent paths in the supply chain. Each tag T in CHECKER stores an IND-CCA encryption of T’s identifier ID and a signature of ID using the polynomial encoding of T’s path as secret key. CHECKER is provably secure and privacy preserving. An adversary can neither inject fake products into the supply chain nor trace products. Moreover, RFID tags in CHECKER can be cheap read/write only tags that are not required to perform any computation. Storage requirements for a tag are low with only 120 Bytes.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: RFID counterfeit detection privacy
Contact author(s): kaoutar elkhiyaoui @ eurecom fr
History: 2012-05-09: revised; 2011-12-09: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2011/651
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/651,
      author = {Kaoutar Elkhiyaoui and Erik-Oliver Blass and Refik Molva},
      title = {CHECKER: On-site checking in RFID-based supply chains},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/651},
      year = {2011},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/651}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/651}
}