Towards a Probabilistic Complexity-theoretic Modeling of Biological Cyanide Poisoning as Service Attack in Self-organizing Networks

Jiejun Kong, Dapeng Wu, Xiaoyan Hong, and Mario Gerla

Abstract

We draw an analogy of \emph{biological cyanide poisoning} to security attacks in self-organizing mobile ad hoc networks. When a circulatory system is treated as an enclosed network space, a hemoglobin is treated as a mobile node, and a hemoglobin binding with cyanide ion is treated as a compromised node (which cannot bind with oxygen to furnish its oxygen-transport function), we show how cyanide poisoning can reduce the probability of oxygen/message delivery to a rigorously defined negligible'' quantity. Like formal cryptography, security problem in our network-centric model is defined on the complexity-theoretic concept of negligible'', which is asymptotically sub-polynomial with respect to a pre-defined system parameter $x$. Intuitively, the parameter $x$ is the key length $n$ in formal cryptography, but is changed to the network scale, or the number of network nodes $N$, in our model. We use the $\RP$ ($n$-runs) complexity class with a virtual oracle to formally model the cyanide poisoning phenomenon and similar network threats. This new analytic approach leads to a new view of biological threats from the perspective of network security and complexity theoretic study.

Available format(s)
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Contact author(s)
jiejunkong @ yahoo com
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2011/639

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/639,
author = {Jiejun Kong and Dapeng Wu and Xiaoyan Hong and Mario Gerla},
title = {Towards a Probabilistic Complexity-theoretic Modeling of Biological Cyanide Poisoning as Service Attack in Self-organizing Networks},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/639},
year = {2011},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/639}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/639}
}

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