**Towards a Probabilistic Complexity-theoretic Modeling of Biological Cyanide Poisoning as Service Attack in Self-organizing Networks**

*Jiejun Kong, Dapeng Wu, Xiaoyan Hong, Mario Gerla*

**Abstract: **We draw an analogy of \emph{biological cyanide poisoning} to security
attacks in self-organizing mobile ad hoc networks. When a circulatory
system is treated as an enclosed network space, a hemoglobin is treated
as a mobile node, and a hemoglobin binding with cyanide ion is treated
as a compromised node (which cannot bind with oxygen to furnish its
oxygen-transport function), we show how cyanide poisoning can reduce the
probability of oxygen/message delivery to a rigorously defined
``negligible'' quantity. Like formal cryptography, security problem in
our network-centric model is defined on the complexity-theoretic concept
of ``negligible'', which is asymptotically sub-polynomial with respect
to a pre-defined system parameter $x$. Intuitively, the parameter $x$
is the key length $n$ in formal cryptography, but is changed to the
network scale, or the number of network nodes $N$, in our model. We use
the $\RP$ ($n$-runs) complexity class with a virtual oracle to formally
model the cyanide poisoning phenomenon and similar network threats.
This new
analytic approach leads to a new view of biological threats from the
perspective of network security and complexity theoretic study.

**Category / Keywords: **foundations / biochemical science based on complexity theory

**Date: **received 25 Nov 2011

**Contact author: **jiejunkong at yahoo com

**Available format(s): **Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation

**Version: **20111129:220737 (All versions of this report)

**Short URL: **ia.cr/2011/639

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