Paper 2011/633
Practical realisation and elimination of an ECC-related software bug attack
B. B. Brumley, M. Barbosa, D. Page, and F. Vercauteren
Abstract
We analyse and exploit implementation features in OpenSSL version 0.9.8g which permit an attack against ECDH-based functionality. The attack, although more general, can recover the entire (static) private key from an associated SSL server via $633$ adaptive queries when the NIST curve P-256 is used. One can view it as a software-oriented analogue of the bug attack concept due to Biham et al. and, consequently, as the first bug attack to be successfully applied against a real-world system. In addition to the attack and a posteriori countermeasures, we show that formal verification, while rarely used at present, is a viable means of detecting the features which the attack hinges on. Based on the security implications of the attack and the extra justification posed by the possibility of intentionally incorrect implementations in collaborative software development, we conclude that applying and extending the coverage of formal verification to augment existing test strategies for OpenSSL-like software should be deemed a worthwhile, long-term challenge.
Note: Updated to include details of invalid curve attack
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. This is the full version of a shorter paper to appear at CT-RSA 2012
- Keywords
- elliptic curveOpenSSLNISTfault attackbug attack
- Contact author(s)
- page @ cs bris ac uk
- History
- 2012-03-06: revised
- 2011-11-26: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/633
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/633,
author = {B. B. Brumley and M. Barbosa and D. Page and F. Vercauteren},
title = {Practical realisation and elimination of an {ECC}-related software bug attack},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/633},
year = {2011},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/633}
}
