Standard Security Does Not Imply Security Against Selective-Opening

Mihir Bellare; Rafael Dowsley; Brent Waters; Scott Yilek

Paper 2011/581

Standard Security Does Not Imply Security Against Selective-Opening

Mihir Bellare, Rafael Dowsley, Brent Waters, and Scott Yilek

Abstract

We show that no commitment scheme that is hiding and binding according to the standard definition is semantically-secure under selective opening attack (SOA), resolving a long-standing and fundamental open question about the power of SOAs. We also obtain the first examples of IND-CPA encryption schemes that are not secure under SOA, both for sender corruptions where encryption coins are revealed and receiver corruptions where decryption keys are revealed. These results assume only the existence of collision-resistant hash functions.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF PS
Publication info: Published elsewhere. A preliminary version appears on EUROCRYPT 2012. This is the full version.
Keywords: Commitment schemes encryption impossibility results attacks
Contact author(s): mihir @ eng ucsd edu
History: 2012-01-18: revised; 2011-11-02: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2011/581
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/581,
      author = {Mihir Bellare and Rafael Dowsley and Brent Waters and Scott Yilek},
      title = {Standard Security Does Not Imply Security Against Selective-Opening},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/581},
      year = {2011},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/581}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/581}
}