Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2011/544
Designing Privacy-preserving Smart Meters with Low-cost Microcontrollers
Andres Molina-Markham and George Danezis and Kevin Fu and Prashant Shenoy and David Irwin
Abstract: Smart meters that track fine-grained electricity usage and implement
sophisticated usage-based billing policies, e.g., based on time-of-use, are a
key component of recent smart grid initiatives that aim to increase the
electric grid's efficiency. A key impediment to widespread smart meter
deployment is that fine-grained usage data indirectly reveals detailed
information about consumer behavior, such as when occupants are home, when
they have guests or their eating and sleeping patterns. Recent research
proposes cryptographic solutions that enable sophisticated billing policies
without leaking information. However, prior research does not measure the
performance constraints of real-world smart meters, which use cheap
ultra-low-power microcontrollers to lower deployment costs. In this paper, we
explore the feasibility of designing privacy-preserving smart meters using
low-cost microcontrollers and provide a general methodology for estimating
design costs. We show that it is feasible to produce certified meter readings
for use in billing protocols relying on Zero-Knowledge Proofs with
microcontrollers such as those inside currently deployed smart meters. Our
prototype meter is capable of producing these readings every 10 seconds using
a $3.30USD MSP430 microcontroller, while less powerful microcontrollers
deployed in today's smart meters are capable of producing readings every 28
seconds. In addition to our results, our goal is to provide smart meter
designers with a general methodology for selecting an appropriate balance
between platform performance, power consumption, and monetary cost that
accommodates privacy-preserving billing protocols.
Category / Keywords: applications / zero-knowledge, privacy, metering, microcontrollers
Publication Info: In Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security. February 2012.
Date: received 3 Oct 2011, last revised 24 Jun 2012
Contact author: amolina at cs umass edu
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: Changes to match the conference paper and acknowledge supporting grants.
Version: 20120624:233421 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2011/544
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