Paper 2011/517

Verifiability, Privacy, and Coercion-Resistance: New Insights from a Case Study

Ralf Kuesters, Tomasz Truderung, and Andreas Vogt


In this paper, we present new insights into central properties of voting systems, namely verifiability, privacy, and coercion-resistance. We demonstrate that the combination of the two forms of verifiability considered in the literature---individual and universal verifiability---are, unlike commonly believed, insufficient to guarantee overall verifiability. We also demonstrate that the relationship between coercion-resistance and privacy is more subtle than suggested in the literature. Our findings are partly based on a case study of prominent voting systems, ThreeBallot and VAV, for which, among others, we show that, unlike commonly believed, they do not provide any reasonable level of verifiability, even though they satisfy individual and universal verifiability. Also, we show that the original variants of ThreeBallot and VAV provide a better level of coercion-resistance than of privacy.

Note: Added publication information as well as some explanation in Section 5.2.

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. Proceedings of the 32nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P 2011)
votingverifiabilitycoercion-resistanceprivacyprotocol analysis
Contact author(s)
kuesters @ uni-trier de
2015-02-02: revised
2011-09-22: received
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Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Ralf Kuesters and Tomasz Truderung and Andreas Vogt},
      title = {Verifiability, Privacy, and Coercion-Resistance: New Insights from a Case Study},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/517},
      year = {2011},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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