Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2011/369

Storing Secrets on Continually Leaky Devices

Yevgeniy Dodis and Allison Lewko and Brent Waters and Daniel Wichs

Abstract: We consider the question of how to store a value secretly on devices that continually leak information about their internal state to an external attacker. If the secret value is stored on a single device from which it is efficiently retrievable, and the attacker can leak even a single predicate of the internal state of that device, then she may learn some information about the secret value itself. Therefore, we consider a setting where the secret value is shared between multiple devices (or multiple components of a single device), each of which continually leaks arbitrary adaptively chosen predicates its individual state. Since leakage is continual, each device must also continually update its state so that an attacker cannot just leak it entirely one bit at a time. In our model, the devices update their state individually and asynchronously, without any communication between them. The update process is necessarily randomized, and its randomness can leak as well.

As our main result, we construct a sharing scheme for two devices, where a constant fraction of the internal state of each device can leak in between and during updates. Our scheme has the structure of a public-key encryption, where one share is a secret key and the other is a ciphertext. As a contribution of independent interest, we also get public-key encryption in the continual leakage model, introduced by Brakerski et al. and Dodis et al. (FOCS '10). This scheme tolerates continual leakage on the secret key and the updates, and simplifies the recent construction of Lewko, Lewko and Waters (STOC '11). For our main result, we show how to update the ciphertexts of the encryption scheme so that the message remains hidden even if an attacker interleaves leakage on secret key and ciphertext shares. The security of our scheme is based on the linear assumption in prime-order bilinear groups.

We also provide an extension to general access structures realizable by linear secret sharing schemes across many devices. The main advantage of this extension is that the state of some devices can be compromised entirely, while that of the all remaining devices is susceptible to continual leakage.

Lastly, we show impossibility of information theoretic sharing schemes in our model, where continually leaky devices update their state individually.

Category / Keywords: foundations / secret sharing, public-key encryption, leakage resilience

Publication Info: Full version of FOCS 2011 paper.

Date: received 6 Jul 2011, last revised 6 Jul 2011

Contact author: wichs at cs nyu edu

Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190217:224314 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2011/369