### The Exact Security of a Stateful IBE and New Compact Stateful PKE Schemes

S. Sree Vivek, S. Sharmila Deva Selvi, and C. Pandu Rangan

##### Abstract

Recently, Baek et al. proposed a stateful identity based encryption scheme with compact ciphertext and commented that the security of the scheme can be reduced to the Computational Bilinear Diffie Hellman (CBDH) problem. In this paper, we formally prove that the security of the stateful identity based encryption scheme by Baek et al. cannot be reduced to the CBDH problem. In fact, we show that the challenger will confront the Y-Computational problem while providing the decryption oracle access to the adversary. We provide the exact and formal security proof for the scheme, assuming the hardness of the Gap Bilinear Diffie Hellman (GBDH) problem. We also propose two new stateful public key encryption scheme with ciphertext verifiability. Our schemes offer more compact ciphertext when compared to all existing stateful public key encryption schemes with ciphertext verifiability. We have proved all the schemes in the random oracle model.

Note: The previous draft had some subtle defects and it was pointed out by Dr. Gregory M. Zaverucha. We thank him for pointing out the defect in the previous draft, which helped us to improve the result.

Available format(s)
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Stateful Identity Based EncryptionAdaptive Chosen Ciphertext (CCA)Provable SecurityCompact Ciphertext withwithout Ciphertext VerificationRandom Oracle model.
Contact author(s)
ssreevivek @ gmail com
sharmioshin @ gmail com
History
2012-03-20: last of 3 revisions
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2011/361

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/361,
author = {S.  Sree Vivek and S.  Sharmila Deva Selvi and C.  Pandu Rangan},
title = {The Exact Security of a Stateful IBE and New Compact Stateful PKE Schemes},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/361},
year = {2011},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/361}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/361}
}

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