Paper 2011/287
Algebraic cryptanalysis of the round-reduced and side channel analysis of the full PRINTCipher-48
Stanislav Bulygin
Abstract
In this paper we analyze the recently proposed light-weight block cipher PRINTCipher. Applying algebraic methods and SAT-solving we are able to break 8 rounds of PRINTCipher-48 with only 2 known plaintexts and 9 rounds under some additional assumptions. We show that it is possible to break the full 48-round cipher by assuming a moderate leakage of internal state bits or even just Hamming weights. Such a simulation side-channel attack has practical complexity. We investigate applicability of our method to cryptanalysis of the full PRINTCipher-48.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Algebraic cryptanalysisSAT-solvingPRINTCipherMiniSATCryptoMiniSAT
- Contact author(s)
- Stanislav Bulygin @ cased de
- History
- 2011-06-03: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/287
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/287,
author = {Stanislav Bulygin},
title = {Algebraic cryptanalysis of the round-reduced and side channel analysis of the full PRINTCipher-48},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/287},
year = {2011},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/287}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/287}
}
