### Universal Composability from Essentially Any Trusted Setup

Mike Rosulek

##### Abstract

It is impossible to securely carry out general multi-party computation in arbitrary network contexts like the Internet, unless protocols have access to some trusted setup. In this work we classify the power of such trusted (2-party) setup functionalities. We show that nearly every setup is either {\bf useless} (ideal access to the setup is equivalent to having no setup at all) or else {\bf complete} (composably secure protocols for {\em all} tasks exist in the presence of the setup). We further argue that those setups which are neither complete nor useless are highly unnatural. The main technical contribution in this work is an almost-total characterization of completeness for 2-party setups. Our characterization treats setup functionalities as black-boxes, and therefore is the first work to classify completeness of {\em arbitrary setup functionalities} (i.e., randomized, reactive, and having behavior that depends on the global security parameter).

Available format(s)
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Extended abstract appears in CRYPTO 2012
Keywords
universal compositionmulti-party computation
Contact author(s)
mikero @ cs umt edu
History
2012-05-31: last of 2 revisions
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2011/240

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/240,
author = {Mike Rosulek},
title = {Universal Composability from Essentially Any Trusted Setup},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/240},
year = {2011},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/240}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/240}
}

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