Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2011/197

Public Key Encryption for the Forgetful

Puwen Wei and Yuliang Zheng and Xiaoyun Wang

Abstract: We investigate public key encryption that allows the originator of a ciphertext to retrieve a ``forgotten'' plaintext from the ciphertext. This type of public key encryption with ``backward recovery'' contrasts more widely analyzed public key encryption with ``forward secrecy''. We advocate that together they form the two sides of a whole coin, whereby offering complementary roles in data security, especially in cloud computing, 3G/4G communications and other emerging computing and communication platforms. We formalize the notion of public key encryption with backward recovery, and present two construction methods together with formal analyses of their security. The first method embodies a generic public key encryption scheme with backward recovery using the ``encrypt then sign" paradigm, whereas the second method provides a more efficient scheme that is built on Hofheinz and Kiltz's public key encryption in conjunction with target collision resistant hashing. Security of the first method is proved in a two-user setting, whereas the second is in a more general multi-user setting.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / public key encryption, backward recovery

Date: received 18 Apr 2011

Contact author: pwei at sdu edu cn

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20110425:192122 (All versions of this report)

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