Paper 2011/194
Cryptanalysis of Chen \textit{et al.}'s RFID Access Control Protocol
Masoumeh Safkhani, Nasour Bagheri, and Majid Naderi
Abstract
Recently Chen \textit{et al.} have proposed a RFID access control protocol based on the strategy of indefinite-index and challenge-response. They have claimed that their protocol provides optimal location privacy and resists against man in the middle, spoofed tag and spoofed reader attacks. However, in this paper we show that Chen \textit{ et al.} protocol does not provide the claimed security. More precisely, we present the following attacks on the protocol: \begin{enumerate} \item Tag impersonation attack. \item Reader impersonation attack. \item Location traceability attack. \end{enumerate} All attacks presented in this paper have the success probability of '1' on the cost of only one or two runs of protocol.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- RFIDAccess ControlSpoofed Reader AttackAuthenticationDesynchronization Attack.
- Contact author(s)
-
nbagheri @ srttu edu
na bagheri @ gmail com - History
- 2011-04-25: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/194
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/194,
author = {Masoumeh Safkhani and Nasour Bagheri and Majid Naderi},
title = {Cryptanalysis of Chen \textit{et al.}'s {RFID} Access Control Protocol},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/194},
year = {2011},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/194}
}
