**Secure Multiparty Computation with Partial Fairness**

*Amos Beimel, Eran Omri, and Ilan Orlov*

**Abstract: **A protocol for computing a functionality is secure if an adversary in this protocol cannot cause more harm than in an ideal computation where parties give their inputs to a trusted party which returns the
output of the functionality to all parties. In particular, in the ideal model such computation is fair – all parties get the output. Cleve (STOC 1986) proved that, in general, fairness is not possible without an honest majority. To overcome this impossibility, Gordon and Katz (Eurocrypt 2010) suggested a relaxed definition – 1/p-secure computation – which guarantees partial fairness. For two parties, they
construct 1/p-secure protocols for functionalities for which the size of either their domain or their range is polynomial (in the security parameter). Gordon and Katz ask whether their results can be extended to multiparty protocols.

We study 1/p-secure protocols in the multiparty setting for general functionalities. Our main result is constructions of 1/p-secure protocols when the number of parties is constant provided that less than 2/3 of the parties are corrupt. Our protocols require that either (1) the functionality is deterministic and the size of the domain is polynomial (in the security parameter), or (2) the functionality can be randomized and the size of the range is polynomial. If the size of the domain is constant and the functionality is deterministic, then our protocol is efficient even when the number of parties is O(log log n) (where n is the security parameter). On the negative side, we show that when the number of parties is super-constant, 1/p-secure protocols are not possible when the size of the domain is polynomial.

**Category / Keywords: **cryptographic protocols /

**Date: **received 23 Nov 2010

**Contact author: **amos beimel at gmail com

**Available format(s): **Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation

**Version: **20101125:045605 (All versions of this report)

**Short URL: **ia.cr/2010/599

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