Paper 2010/508

A Fault Analytic Method against HB+

Jose Carrijo, Rafael Tonicelli, and Anderson C. A. Nascimento


The search for lightweight authentication protocols suitable for low-cost RFID tags constitutes an active and challenging research area. In this context, a family of protocols based on the LPN problem has been proposed: the so-called HB-family. Despite the rich literature regarding the cryptanalysis of these protocols, there are no published results about the impact of fault analysis over them. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by presenting a fault analytic method against a prominent member of the HB-family: HB+ protocol. We demonstrate that the fault analysis model can lead to a flexible and effective attack against HB-like protocols, posing a serious threat over them.

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Fault analysisauthentication protocolsHB+ protocolRFID systems.
Contact author(s)
rafaeltonicelli @ gmail com
2010-10-05: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Jose Carrijo and Rafael Tonicelli and Anderson C.  A.  Nascimento},
      title = {A Fault Analytic Method against HB+},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2010/508},
      year = {2010},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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