Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2010/479

Side-Channel Attacks on the McEliece and Niederreiter Public-Key Cryptosystems

R.M. Avanzi and S. Hoerder and D. Page and M. Tunstall

Abstract: Research within “post-quantum” cryptography has focused on development of schemes that resist quantum cryptanalysis. However, if such schemes are to be deployed, practical questions of efficiency and physical security should also be addressed; this is particularly important for embedded systems. To this end, we investigate issues relating to side-channel attack against the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems, for example improving those presented by [19], and novel countermeasures against such attack.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / post-quantum cryptography, McEliece, Niederreiter, side-channel attacks

Date: received 10 Sep 2010, last revised 14 Sep 2010

Contact author: hoerder at compsci bristol ac uk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Added a reference that appeared after we've written the paper but before we submitted it to eprint.

Version: 20100914:091521 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2010/479