Paper 2010/479
Side-Channel Attacks on the McEliece and Niederreiter Public-Key Cryptosystems
R. M. Avanzi, S. Hoerder, D. Page, and M. Tunstall
Abstract
Research within “post-quantum” cryptography has focused on development of schemes that resist quantum cryptanalysis. However, if such schemes are to be deployed, practical questions of efficiency and physical security should also be addressed; this is particularly important for embedded systems. To this end, we investigate issues relating to side-channel attack against the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems, for example improving those presented by [19], and novel countermeasures against such attack.
Note: Added a reference that appeared after we've written the paper but before we submitted it to eprint.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- post-quantum cryptographyMcElieceNiederreiterside-channel attacks
- Contact author(s)
- hoerder @ compsci bristol ac uk
- History
- 2010-09-14: revised
- 2010-09-12: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2010/479
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/479,
author = {R. M. Avanzi and S. Hoerder and D. Page and M. Tunstall},
title = {Side-Channel Attacks on the McEliece and Niederreiter Public-Key Cryptosystems},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2010/479},
year = {2010},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/479}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/479}
}
