Paper 2010/462

Unconditionally Secure Rational Secret Sharing in Standard Communication Networks

Zhifang Zhang

Abstract

Rational secret sharing protocols in both the two-party and multi-party settings are proposed. These protocols are built in standard communication networks and with unconditional security. Namely, the protocols run over standard point-to-point networks without requiring physical assumptions or simultaneous channels, and even a computationally unbounded player cannot gain more than $\epsilon$ by deviating from the protocol. More precisely, for the $2$-out-of-$2$ protocol the $\epsilon$ is a negligible function in the size of the secret, which is caused by the information-theoretic MACs used for authentication. The $t$-out-of-$n$ protocol is $(t-1)$-resilient and the $\epsilon$ is exponentially small in the number of participants. Although secret recovery cannot be guaranteed in this setting, a participant can at least reduce the Shannon entropy of the secret to less than $1$ after the protocol. When the secret-domain is large, every rational player has great incentive to participate in the protocol.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
rational secret sharing$\epsilon$-Nash equilibriumunconditional security
Contact author(s)
zfz @ amss ac cn
History
2010-11-02: revised
2010-08-31: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2010/462
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/462,
      author = {Zhifang Zhang},
      title = {Unconditionally Secure Rational Secret Sharing in Standard Communication Networks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/462},
      year = {2010},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/462}
}
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