Paper 2010/440
Piret and Quisquater's DFA on AES Revisited
Christophe Giraud and Adrian Thillard
Abstract
At CHES 2003, Piret and Quisquater published a very efficient DFA on AES which has served as a basis for many variants published afterwards. In this paper, we revisit P&Q's DFA on AES and we explain how this attack can be much more efficient than originally claimed. In particular, we show that only 2 (resp. 3) faulty ciphertexts allow an attacker to efficiently recover the key in the case of AES-192 (resp. AES-256). Our attack on AES-256 is the most efficient attack on this key length published so far.
Note: Small update to emphasize the contribution of this paper.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- DFAAES
- Contact author(s)
- c giraud @ oberthur com
- History
- 2011-05-16: revised
- 2010-08-13: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2010/440
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/440,
author = {Christophe Giraud and Adrian Thillard},
title = {Piret and Quisquater's {DFA} on {AES} Revisited},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/440},
year = {2010},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/440}
}
