The Improbable Differential Attack: Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round CLEFIA

Cihangir Tezcan

Paper 2010/435

The Improbable Differential Attack: Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round CLEFIA

Cihangir Tezcan

Abstract

In this paper we present a new statistical cryptanalytic technique that we call improbable differential cryptanalysis which uses a differential that is less probable when the correct key is used. We provide data complexity estimates for this kind of attacks and we also show a method to expand impossible differentials to improbable differentials. By using this expansion method, we cryptanalyze 13, 14, and 15-round CLEFIA for the key sizes of length 128, 192, and 256 bits, respectively. These are the best cryptanalytic results on CLEFIA up to this date.

Note: Updated to the version that will appear in Indocrypyt 2010.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. To appear in Indocrypyt 2010
Keywords: Cryptanalysis Improbable differential attack CLEFIA
Contact author(s): cihangir tezcan @ epfl ch
History: 2010-10-16: last of 2 revisions; 2010-08-13: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2010/435
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/435,
      author = {Cihangir Tezcan},
      title = {The Improbable Differential Attack: Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round CLEFIA},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2010/435},
      year = {2010},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/435}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/435}
}