Paper 2010/408
Improved Trace-Driven Cache-Collision Attacks against Embedded AES Implementations
Jean-François Gallais, Ilya Kizhvatov, and Michael Tunstall
Abstract
In this paper we present two attacks that exploit cache events, which are visible in some side channel, to derive a secret key used in an implementation of AES. The first is an improvement of an adaptive chosen plaintext attack presented at ACISP 2006. The second is a new known plaintext attack that can recover a 128-bit key with approximately 30 measurements to reduce the number of key hypotheses to 2^30. This is comparable to classical Dierential Power Analysis; however, our attacks are able to overcome certain masking techniques. We also show how to deal with unreliable cache event detection in the real-life measurement scenario and present practical explorations on a 32-bit ARM microprocessor.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. An extended abstract of this paper will appear at WISA 2010. This is the full version.
- Keywords
- Side channel attackspower analysiscache attacksAES
- Contact author(s)
- jean-francois gallais @ uni lu
- History
- 2010-09-23: last of 2 revisions
- 2010-07-21: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2010/408
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/408,
author = {Jean-François Gallais and Ilya Kizhvatov and Michael Tunstall},
title = {Improved Trace-Driven Cache-Collision Attacks against Embedded {AES} Implementations},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/408},
year = {2010},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/408}
}
