Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2010/405

Privacy-Preserving RFID Systems: Model and Constructions

S├ębastien Canard and Iwen Coisel and Jonathan Etrog and Marc Girault

Abstract: In this paper, we study systems where a reader wants to authenticate and identify legitimate RFID tags. Such system needs thus to be correct (legitimate tags are accepted) and sound (fake tags are rejected). Moreover, an RFID tag in a privacy-preserving system should be anonymous and untraceable, except for the legitimate reader. We here present the first security model for RFID authentication/identification privacy-preserving systems which is at the same time complete and easy to use. Our correctness property permits to take into account active adversaries. Our soundness property incorporates the case of adversaries realizing relay attacks. Finally, our privacy model includes adversaries with no restrictions on their interactions with the system and moreover takes into account the case of ``future correlations''. We next propose several constructions, based on the work from Vaudenay, proving that (i) our strongest property is at least as strong as those of Vaudenay and (ii) this property is reachable by efficient schemes.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / RFID systems, soundness, privacy

Publication Info: full version of the merging of two papers from WLC 2010 and IEEE RFID TA 2010

Date: received 20 Jul 2010

Contact author: sebastien canard at orange-ftgroup com

Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20100721:130753 (All versions of this report)

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