Paper 2010/345
Robust RFID Authentication Protocol with Formal Proof and Its Feasibility
Miyako Ohkubo, Shin'ichiro Matsuo, Yoshikazu Hanatani, Kazuo Sakiyama, and Kazuo Ohta
Abstract
The proloferation of RFID tags enhances everyday activities, such as by letting us reference the price, origin and circulation route of specific goods. On the other hand, this lecel of traceability gives rise to new privacy issues and the topic of developing cryptographic protocols for RFID- tags is garnering much attention. A large amount of research has been conducted in this area. In this paper, we reconsider the security model of RFID- authentication with a man-in-the-middle adversary and communication fault. We define model and security proofs via a game-based approach makes our security models compatible with formal security analysis tools. We show that an RFID authentication protocol is robust against the above attacks, and then provide game-based (hand-written) proofs and their erification by using CryptoVerif.
Note: There were some typos. Those are corrected.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- RFIDauthenticationprivacy
- Contact author(s)
- m ohkubo @ nict go jp
- History
- 2011-02-28: revised
- 2010-06-18: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2010/345
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/345,
author = {Miyako Ohkubo and Shin'ichiro Matsuo and Yoshikazu Hanatani and Kazuo Sakiyama and Kazuo Ohta},
title = {Robust {RFID} Authentication Protocol with Formal Proof and Its Feasibility},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/345},
year = {2010},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/345}
}
