Efficient Differential Fault Analysis for AES

Shigeto Gomisawa, Yang Li, Junko Takahashi, Toshinori Fukunaga, Yu Sasaki, Kazuo Sakiyama, and Kazuo Ohta

Abstract

This paper proposes improved post analysis methods for Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) against AES. In detail, we propose three techniques to improve the attack efficiency as 1) combining previous DFA methods, 2) performing a divide-and-conquer attack by considering the AES key-schedule structure, and 3) taking the linearity of the MixColumns operation into account. As a result, the expectation of the analysis time in the previous work can be reduced to about one sixteenth. Notice that these improvements are based on the detailed analysis of the previous DFA methods and the calculation time and memory cost in practical implementations. Moreover, the proposed techniques can be widely applied to DFA attacks under different assumptions.

Available format(s)
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Fault Analysis AttackDFAAESDivide-and-Conquer
Contact author(s)
g-shigeto-lfat @ ice uec ac jp
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2010/336

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/336,
author = {Shigeto Gomisawa and Yang Li and Junko Takahashi and Toshinori Fukunaga and Yu Sasaki and Kazuo Sakiyama and Kazuo Ohta},
title = {Efficient Differential Fault Analysis for AES},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2010/336},
year = {2010},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/336}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/336}
}

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