Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2010/312

Security weakness of two authenticated key exchange protocols from pairings

Qingfeng Cheng and Chuangui Ma

Abstract: Recently, Liu proposed two authenticated multiple key exchange protocols using pairings, and claimed two protocols featured many security attributes. In this paper, we show that Liuís protocols are insecure. Both of Liuís protocols cannot provide perfect forward secrecy.

Category / Keywords: Key compromise impersonation attack; Authenticated key exchange; Multiple key; Perfect forward secrecy

Date: received 25 May 2010, last revised 29 May 2010

Contact author: qingfengc2008 at sina com

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Version: 20100529:161345 (All versions of this report)

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