Paper 2010/265

CCA-Secure Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption in the Adaptive Corruption Model without Random Oracles

Jian Weng, Minrong Chen, Yanjiang Yang, Robert H. Deng, Kefei Chen, and Feng Bao

Abstract

Proxy re-encryption (PRE), introduced by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss in Eurocrypt'98, allows a semi-trusted proxy to convert a ciphertext originally intended for Alice into an encryption of the same message intended for Bob. PRE has recently drawn great interest, and many interesting PRE schemes have been proposed. However, up to now, it is still an important question to come up with a chosen-ciphertext secure unidirectional PRE in the adaptive corruption model. To address this problem, we propose a new unidirectional PRE scheme, and prove its chosen-ciphertext security in the adaptive corruption model without random oracles. Compared with the best known unidirectional PRE scheme proposed by Libert and Vergnaud in PKC'08, our schemes enjoys the advantages of both higher efficiency and stronger security.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. A previous version of this paper appeared in Science China: Information Science, 2010, 53(3): 593-606
Keywords
unidirectional proxy re-encryptionadaptive corruption modelchosen-ciphertext attack
Contact author(s)
cryptjweng @ gmail com
History
2010-05-11: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2010/265
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/265,
      author = {Jian Weng and Minrong Chen and Yanjiang Yang and Robert H.  Deng and Kefei Chen and Feng Bao},
      title = {{CCA}-Secure Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption in the Adaptive Corruption Model without Random Oracles},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/265},
      year = {2010},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/265}
}
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