Paper 2010/256

On the Public Key Replacement and Universal Forgery Attacks of Short Certificateless Signature

Mingwu Zhang, Tsuyoshi Takagi, and Bo Yang


Certificateless cryptography eliminates the need of certificates in the PKI and solves the inherent key escrow problem in the ID-based cryptography. Recently, Du and Wen proposed a short certi¯cateless signature scheme without MapToPoint hash function, and the signature size is short enough with only half of the DSA signature. In this paper, after the detailing the formal of certificateless signature scheme, we show that the Du and Wen's short certificateless signature scheme is insecure which is broken by a type-I adversary who has the ability in replacing users' public keys and accessing to the signing oracles, and it also cannot resist on the universal forgery attack for any third user.

Available format(s)
-- withdrawn --
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Contact author(s)
csmwzhang @ gmail com
2010-05-08: withdrawn
2010-05-05: received
See all versions
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, does not use cookies or embedded third party content.