Paper 2010/237
A New Security Model for Authenticated Key Agreement
Augustin P. Sarr, Philippe Elbaz–Vincent, and Jean–Claude Bajard
Abstract
The Canetti--Krawczyk (CK) and extended Canetti--Krawczyk (eCK) security models, are widely used to provide security arguments for key agreement protocols. We discuss security shades in the (e)CK models, and some practical attacks unconsidered in (e)CK--security arguments. We propose a strong security model which encompasses the eCK one. We also propose a new protocol, called Strengthened MQV (SMQV), which in addition to provide the same efficiency as the (H)MQV protocols, is particularly suited for distributed implementations wherein a tamper--proof device is used to store long--lived keys, while session keys are used on an untrusted host machine. The SMQV protocol meets our security definition under the Gap Diffie--Hellman assumption and the Random Oracle model.
Note: Typographical corrections.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. A short version of this paper is accepted at SCN 2010
- Keywords
- authenticated key agreementpractical vulnerabilitystrengthened eCK modelSMQV
- Contact author(s)
-
a sarr @ netheos net
augussarr @ yahoo fr - History
- 2012-01-05: last of 4 revisions
- 2010-04-28: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2010/237
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/237,
author = {Augustin P. Sarr and Philippe Elbaz–Vincent and Jean–Claude Bajard},
title = {A New Security Model for Authenticated Key Agreement},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2010/237},
year = {2010},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/237}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/237}
}
