### A calculus for game-based security proofs

David Nowak and Yu Zhang

##### Abstract

The game-based approach to security proofs in cryptography is a widely-used methodology for writing proofs rigorously. However a unifying language for writing games is still missing. In this paper we show how CSLR, a probabilistic lambda-calculus with a type system that guarantees that computations are probabilistic polynomial time, can be equipped with a notion of game indistinguishability. This allows us to dene cryptographic constructions, eective adversaries, security notions, computational assumptions, game transformations, and game-based security proofs in the unied framework provided by CSLR. Our code for cryptographic constructions is close to implementation in the sense that we do not assume primitive uniform distributions but use a realistic algorithm to approximate them. We illustrate our calculus on cryptographic constructions for public-key encryption and pseudorandom bit generation.

Available format(s)
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
game-based proofsimplicit complexitycomputational indistinguishability
Contact author(s)
yu zhang @ gmail com
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2010/230

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/230,
author = {David Nowak and Yu Zhang},
title = {A calculus for game-based security proofs},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2010/230},
year = {2010},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/230}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/230}
}

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