Paper 2010/219

Tracker: Security and Privacy for RFID-based Supply Chains

Erik-Oliver Blass, Kaoutar Elkhiyaoui, and Refik Molva


The counterfeiting of pharmaceutics or luxury objects is a major threat to supply chains today. As different facilities of a supply chain are distributed and difficult to monitor, malicious adversaries can inject fake objects into the supply chain. This paper presents Tracker, a protocol for object genuineness verification in RFID-based supply chains. More precisely, Tracker allows to securely identify which (legitimate) path an object/tag has taken through a supply chain. Tracker provides privacy: an adversary can neither learn details about an object's path, nor can it trace and link objects in supply chain. Tracker's security and privacy is based on an extension of polynomial signature techniques for run-time fault detection using homomorphic encryption. Contrary to related work, RFID tags in this paper are not required to perform \emph{any computation}, but only feature a few bytes of storage such as ordinary EPC Class 1 Gen 2 tags.

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
RFIDprivacysupply chain managementcounterfeiting
Contact author(s)
erik-oliver blass @ eurecom fr
2011-02-04: revised
2010-04-19: received
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Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Erik-Oliver Blass and Kaoutar Elkhiyaoui and Refik Molva},
      title = {Tracker: Security and Privacy for RFID-based Supply Chains},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2010/219},
      year = {2010},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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