Paper 2010/199

A Framework for Fully-Simulatable t-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer

Bing Zeng, Christophe Tartary, and Chingfang Hsu

Abstract

Oblivious transfer is a fundamental building block for multiparty computation protocols. In this paper, we present a generally realizable framework for fully-simulatable t-out-of-n oblivious transfer (OTtn) with security against non-adaptive malicious adversaries in the plain mode. Our construction relies on a single cryptographic primitive which is a variant of smooth projective hashing (SPH). A direct consequence of our work is that the existence of protocols for OTtn is reduced to the existence of this SPH variant. Before this paper, the only known reductions provided half-simulatable security and every known efficient protocol involved at least two distinct cryptographic primitives. We show how to instantiate this new SPH variant under not only the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, the decisional -th residuosity assumption and the decisional quadratic residuosity assumption as currently existing SPH constructions, but also the learning with errors problem. Our framework only needs communication rounds, which implies that it is more round-efficient than known protocols holding identical features.

Note: Submitted for Publication.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown status
Keywords
oblivious transferpublic-key cryptographyquantum cryptographylattice techniques
Contact author(s)
zeng bing zb @ gmail com
History
2016-03-20: last of 10 revisions
2010-04-16: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2010/199
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/199,
      author = {Bing Zeng and Christophe Tartary and Chingfang Hsu},
      title = {A Framework for Fully-Simulatable $t$-out-of-$n$ Oblivious Transfer},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/199},
      year = {2010},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/199}
}
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