Paper 2010/191

On Designated Verifier Signature Schemes

Michal Rjaško and Martin Stanek


Designated verifier signature schemes allow a signer to convince only the designated verifier that a signed message is authentic. We define attack models on the unforgeability property of such schemes and analyze relationships among the models. We show that the no-message model, where an adversary is given only public keys, is equivalent to the model, where an adversary has also oracle access to the verification algorithm. We also show a separation between the no-message model and the chosen-message model, where an adversary has access to the signing algorithm. Furthermore, we present a modification of the Yang-Liao designated verifier signature scheme and prove its security. The security of the modified scheme is based on the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, while the original scheme requires strong Diffie-Hellman assumption.

Available format(s)
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Contact author(s)
rjasko @ dcs fmph uniba sk
2010-06-29: last of 2 revisions
2010-04-09: received
See all versions
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Michal Rjaško and Martin Stanek},
      title = {On Designated Verifier Signature Schemes},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2010/191},
      year = {2010},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, does not use cookies or embedded third party content.