### A Flaw in The Internal State Recovery Attack on ALPHA-MAC

Shengbao Wu, Mingsheng Wang, and Zheng Yuan

##### Abstract

An distinguisher was constructed by utilizing a 2-round collision differential path of ALPHA-MAC, with about $2^{65.5}$ chosen messages and $2^{65.5}$ queries. Then, this distinguisher was used to recover the internal state(\cite{Yuan1},\cite{Yuan2}). However, a flaw is found in the internal state recovery attack. The complexity of recovering the internal state is up to $2^{81}$ exhaustive search. And the complexity of the whole attack will be up to $2^{67}$ chosen messages and $2^{81}$ exhaustive search. To repair the flaw, a modified 2-round differential path of ALPHA-MAC is present and a new distinguisher based on this path is proposed. Finally, an attack with about $2^{65.5}$ chosen messages and $2^{65.5}$ queries is obtained under the new distinguisher.

Available format(s)
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Distinguishing attackInternal state recoveryALPHA-MACDifferential path
Contact author(s)
wushengbao @ is iscas ac cn
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2010/160

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/160,
author = {Shengbao Wu and Mingsheng Wang and Zheng Yuan},
title = {A Flaw in The Internal State Recovery Attack on ALPHA-MAC},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2010/160},
year = {2010},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/160}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/160}
}

Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.