Identity-Based Encryption Secure against Selective Opening Attack

Mihir Bellare; Brent Waters; Scott Yilek

Paper 2010/159

Identity-Based Encryption Secure against Selective Opening Attack

Mihir Bellare, Brent Waters, and Scott Yilek

Abstract

We present the first Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) schemes that are proven secure against selective opening attack (SOA). This means that if an adversary, given a vector of ciphertexts, adaptively corrupts some fraction of the senders, exposing not only their messages but also their coins, the privacy of the unopened messages is guaranteed. Achieving security against such attacks is well-known to be challenging and was only recently solved in the PKE case, but the techniques used there do not solve the IBE case. Our solutions illustrate two techniques to achieving SOA-secure IBE, one based on the Boyen-Waters anonymous IBE and the other based on Waters’ dual-system approach.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: identity-based encryption selective opening attacks
Contact author(s): syilek @ cs ucsd edu
History: 2010-12-07: last of 4 revisions; 2010-03-26: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2010/159
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/159,
      author = {Mihir Bellare and Brent Waters and Scott Yilek},
      title = {Identity-Based Encryption Secure against Selective Opening Attack},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/159},
      year = {2010},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/159}
}