Paper 2010/159

Identity-Based Encryption Secure against Selective Opening Attack

Mihir Bellare, Brent Waters, and Scott Yilek

Abstract

We present the first Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) schemes that are proven secure against selective opening attack (SOA). This means that if an adversary, given a vector of ciphertexts, adaptively corrupts some fraction of the senders, exposing not only their messages but also their coins, the privacy of the unopened messages is guaranteed. Achieving security against such attacks is well-known to be challenging and was only recently solved in the PKE case, but the techniques used there do not solve the IBE case. Our solutions illustrate two techniques to achieving SOA-secure IBE, one based on the Boyen-Waters anonymous IBE and the other based on Waters’ dual-system approach.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
identity-based encryptionselective opening attacks
Contact author(s)
syilek @ cs ucsd edu
History
2010-12-07: last of 4 revisions
2010-03-26: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2010/159
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/159,
      author = {Mihir Bellare and Brent Waters and Scott Yilek},
      title = {Identity-Based Encryption Secure against Selective Opening Attack},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2010/159},
      year = {2010},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/159}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/159}
}
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