Paper 2010/108

Perfectly Secure Oblivious RAM Without Random Oracles

Ivan Damgård, Sigurd Meldgaard, and Jesper Buus Nielsen

Abstract

We present an algorithm for implementing a secure oblivious RAM where the access pattern is perfectly hidden in the information theoretic sense, without assuming that the CPU has access to a random oracle. In addition we prove a lover bound on the amount of randomness needed for information theoretically secure oblivious RAM.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
protocolsoblivious RAM
Contact author(s)
ivan @ cs au dk
stm @ cs au dk
jbn @ cs au dk
History
2010-03-02: revised
2010-03-01: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2010/108
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/108,
      author = {Ivan Damgård and Sigurd Meldgaard and Jesper Buus Nielsen},
      title = {Perfectly Secure Oblivious RAM Without Random Oracles},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2010/108},
      year = {2010},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/108}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/108}
}
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