Multiple Bytes Differential Fault Analysis on CLEFIA

Xin-jie ZHAO; Tao WANG; Jing-zhe GAO

Paper 2010/078

Multiple Bytes Differential Fault Analysis on CLEFIA

Xin-jie ZHAO, Tao WANG, and Jing-zhe GAO

Abstract

This paper examines the strength of CLEFIA against multiple bytes differential fault attack. Firstly, it presents the principle of CLEFIA algorithm and differential fault analysis; then, according to injecting faults into the rth,r-1th,r-2th CLEFIA round three conditions, proposes three fault models and corresponding analysis methods; finally, all of the fault model and analysis methods above have been verified through software simulation. Experiment results demonstrate that: CLEFIA is vulnerable to differential fault attack due to its Feistel structure and S-box feature, 5-6,6-8,2 faults are needed to recover CLEFIA-128 based on the three fault models in this paper respectively, multiple byte faults model can greatly improve the attack practicality and even the attack efficiency, and the fault analysis methods in this paper can provide some fault analysis ideas on other block ciphers using S-box.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: Multiple byte faults Differential fault analysis CLEFIA Feistel Structure Block cipher
Contact author(s): zhaoxinjieem @ 163 com
History: 2010-02-20: revised; 2010-02-16: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2010/078
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/078,
      author = {Xin-jie ZHAO and Tao WANG and Jing-zhe GAO},
      title = {Multiple Bytes Differential Fault Analysis on {CLEFIA}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/078},
      year = {2010},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/078}
}