Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2010/056

Improved Cache Trace Attack on AES and CLEFIA by Considering Cache Miss and S-box Misalignment

Xin-jie ZHAO and Tao WANG

Abstract: This paper presents an improved Cache trace attack on AES and CLEFIA by considering Cache miss trace information and S-box misalignment. In 2006, O. AcıiÁmez et al. present a trace driven Cache attack on AES first two rounds, and point out that if the Cache element number of the Cache block is 16, at most 48-bit of AES key can be obtained in the first round attack. Their attack is based on the ideal case when S-box elements are perfected aligned in the Cache block. However, this paper discovers that, the S-box elements are usually misaligned, and due to this feature and by considering Cache miss trace information, about 200 samples are enough to obtain full 128-bit AES key within seconds. In 2010, Chester Rebeiro et al. present the first trace driven Cache attack on C LEFIA by considering Cache hit information and obtain 128-bit key with 243 CLEFIA encryptions. In this paper, we present a new attack on CLEFIA by considering Cache miss information and S-box misalignment features, finally successfully obtain CLEFIA-128 key for about 220 samples within seconds.

Category / Keywords: Trace Driven; Cache Attack; AES; CLEFIA; S-box Misalignment; Cache Miss

Date: received 2 Feb 2010, last revised 5 Feb 2010

Contact author: zhaoxinjieem at 163 com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20100208:094106 (All versions of this report)

Short URL:

[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]