### Improved Cache Trace Attack on AES and CLEFIA by Considering Cache Miss and S-box Misalignment

Xin-jie ZHAO and Tao WANG

##### Abstract

This paper presents an improved Cache trace attack on AES and CLEFIA by considering Cache miss trace information and S-box misalignment. In 2006, O. Ac&#305;içmez et al. present a trace driven Cache attack on AES first two rounds, and point out that if the Cache element number of the Cache block is 16, at most 48-bit of AES key can be obtained in the first round attack. Their attack is based on the ideal case when S-box elements are perfected aligned in the Cache block. However, this paper discovers that, the S-box elements are usually misaligned, and due to this feature and by considering Cache miss trace information, about 200 samples are enough to obtain full 128-bit AES key within seconds. In 2010, Chester Rebeiro et al. present the first trace driven Cache attack on C LEFIA by considering Cache hit information and obtain 128-bit key with 243 CLEFIA encryptions. In this paper, we present a new attack on CLEFIA by considering Cache miss information and S-box misalignment features, finally successfully obtain CLEFIA-128 key for about 220 samples within seconds.

Available format(s)
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Trace DrivenCache AttackAESCLEFIAS-box MisalignmentCache Miss
Contact author(s)
zhaoxinjieem @ 163 com
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2010/056

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/056,
author = {Xin-jie ZHAO and Tao WANG},
title = {Improved Cache Trace Attack on AES and CLEFIA by Considering Cache Miss and S-box Misalignment},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2010/056},
year = {2010},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/056}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/056}
}

Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.