Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2009/576

Public-Key Cryptographic Primitives Provably as Secure as Subset Sum

Vadim Lyubashevsky and Adriana Palacio and Gil Segev

Abstract: We propose a semantically-secure public-key encryption scheme whose security is polynomial-time equivalent to the hardness of solving random instances of the subset sum problem. The subset sum assumption required for the security of our scheme is weaker than that of existing subset-sum based encryption schemes, namely the lattice-based schemes of Ajtai and Dwork (STOC '97), Regev (STOC '03, STOC '05), and Peikert (STOC '09). Additionally, our proof of security is simple and direct. We also present a natural variant of our scheme that is secure against key-leakage attacks, as well as an oblivious transfer protocol that is secure against semi-honest adversaries.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / subset sum, cryptosystem, oblivious transfer

Date: received 27 Nov 2009

Contact author: vlyubash at cs ucsd edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20091201:023300 (All versions of this report)

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