Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2009/575

Differential Fault Analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard using a Single Fault

Michael Tunstall and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay

Abstract: In this paper we present an enhanced Differential Fault Attack that can be applied to the AES using a single fault. We demonstrate that when a single random byte fault is induced that affects the input of the eighth round, the AES key can be deduced using a two stage algorithm. The first step, would be expected to reduce the possible key hypotheses to $2^{32}$, and the second step to a mere $2^{8}$. Furthermore, we show that, with certain faults, this can be further reduced to two key hypotheses.

Category / Keywords: implementation / Differential Fault Analysis

Date: received 25 Nov 2009, last revised 17 Feb 2011

Contact author: tunstall at cs bris ac uk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: A short version of this paper will appear in the proceedings of WISTP 2011

Version: 20110217:211003 (All versions of this report)

Short URL:

[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]