Paper 2009/575
Differential Fault Analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard using a Single Fault
Michael Tunstall and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay
Abstract
In this paper we present an enhanced Differential Fault Attack that can be applied to the AES using a single fault. We demonstrate that when a single random byte fault is induced that affects the input of the eighth round, the AES key can be deduced using a two stage algorithm. The first step, would be expected to reduce the possible key hypotheses to $2^{32}$, and the second step to a mere $2^{8}$. Furthermore, we show that, with certain faults, this can be further reduced to two key hypotheses.
Note: A short version of this paper will appear in the proceedings of WISTP 2011
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Differential Fault Analysis
- Contact author(s)
- tunstall @ cs bris ac uk
- History
- 2011-02-17: revised
- 2009-12-01: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2009/575
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/575,
author = {Michael Tunstall and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay},
title = {Differential Fault Analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard using a Single Fault},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/575},
year = {2009},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/575}
}
