### Differential Fault Analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard using a Single Fault

##### Abstract

In this paper we present an enhanced Differential Fault Attack that can be applied to the AES using a single fault. We demonstrate that when a single random byte fault is induced that affects the input of the eighth round, the AES key can be deduced using a two stage algorithm. The first step, would be expected to reduce the possible key hypotheses to $2^{32}$, and the second step to a mere $2^{8}$. Furthermore, we show that, with certain faults, this can be further reduced to two key hypotheses.

Note: A short version of this paper will appear in the proceedings of WISTP 2011

Available format(s)
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Differential Fault Analysis
Contact author(s)
tunstall @ cs bris ac uk
History
2011-02-17: revised
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2009/575

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/575,
author = {Michael Tunstall and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay},
title = {Differential Fault Analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard using a Single Fault},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2009/575},
year = {2009},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/575}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/575}
}

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