### Fault Attacks Against EMV Signatures

Jean-Sebastien Coron, David Naccache, and Mehdi Tibouchi

##### Abstract

At CHES 2009, Coron, Joux, Kizhvatov, Naccache and Paillier (CJKNP) exhibited a fault attack against RSA signatures with partially known messages. This attack allows factoring the public modulus N. While the size of the unknown message part (UMP) increases with the number of faulty signatures available, the complexity of CJKNP's attack increases exponentially with the number of faulty signatures. This paper describes a simpler attack, whose complexity is polynomial in the number of faults; consequently, the new attack can handle much larger UMPs. The new technique can factor N in a fraction of a second using ten faulty EMV signatures -- a target beyond CJKNP's reach. We show how to apply the attack even when N is unknown, a frequent situation in real-life attacks.

Available format(s)
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Fault AttacksDigital SignaturesRSAISOIEC 9796-2EMV
Contact author(s)
mehdi tibouchi @ ens fr
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2009/503

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/503,
author = {Jean-Sebastien Coron and David Naccache and Mehdi Tibouchi},
title = {Fault Attacks Against EMV Signatures},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2009/503},
year = {2009},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/503}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/503}
}

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