Cryptanalysis of Multiple-Server Password-Authenticated Key

Sang-Gon Lee

Paper 2009/490

Cryptanalysis of Multiple-Server Password-Authenticated Key

Sang-Gon Lee

Abstract

Password-based user-authentication schemes have been widely used when users access a server to avail internet services. Multiserver password-authentication schemes enable remote users to obtain service from multiple servers without separately registering with each server. In 2008, Jia-Lun Tsai proposed an improved and efficient password-authenticated key agreement scheme for a multiserver architecture based on Chang-Lee’s scheme proposed in 2004. However, we found that Tsai’s scheme does not provide forward secrecy and is weak to insider impersonation and denial of service attacks. In this article, we describe the drawbacks of Tsai’s scheme and provide a countermeasure to satisfy the forward secrecy property.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: Multiserver Password-authentication Insider Impersonation Attack DoS Attack
Contact author(s): nok60 @ gdsu dongseo ac ktr
History: 2009-11-16: revised; 2009-10-14: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2009/490
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/490,
      author = {Sang-Gon Lee},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of Multiple-Server Password-Authenticated Key},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/490},
      year = {2009},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/490}
}