Paper 2009/428
Efficiently from Semi-honest to Malicious OT via OLFE
Jürg Wullschleger
Abstract
A combiner securely implements a functionality out of a set implementations of another functionality from which some may be insecure. We present two efficient combiners for oblivious linear function evaluation (OLFE). The first is a constant-rate OLFE combiner in the semi-honest model, the second combiner implements Rabin string oblivious transfer (RabinOT) from OLFE in the malicious model. As an application, we show a very efficient reductions in the malicious model of RabinOT over strings to one-out-of-two oblivious transfer over bits (OT) that is only secure in the semi-honest model. For string of size $\ell = \omega(k^2)$, our reductions uses only $4 \ell + o(\ell)$ instances of OT, while previous results required $\Omega(\ell k^2)$. Our new reduction leads to an efficiency improvement for general multi-party computation (MPC) based on semi-honest OT, and makes it almost as efficient as MPC based on malicious OT. All reductions are unconditionally secure, black-box, universally composable and secure against adaptive adversaries.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- oblivious transfermulti-party computationblack-box reductionscombinersuniversal composability
- Contact author(s)
- j wullschleger @ bristol ac uk
- History
- 2009-09-04: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2009/428
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/428, author = {Jürg Wullschleger}, title = {Efficiently from Semi-honest to Malicious {OT} via {OLFE}}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/428}, year = {2009}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/428} }