Paper 2009/414
Security Bounds for the Design of Code-based Cryptosystems
Matthieu Finiasz and Nicolas Sendrier
Abstract
Code-based cryptography is often viewed as an interesting ``Post-Quantum'' alternative to the classical number theory cryptography. Unlike many other such alternatives, it has the convenient advantage of having only a few, well identified, attack algorithms. However, improvements to these algorithms have made their effective complexity quite complex to compute. We give here some lower bounds on the work factor of idealized versions of these algorithms, taking into account all possible tweaks which could improve their practical complexity. The aim of this article is to help designers select durably secure parameters.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. This is an extended version (with additional proofs included) of the article from Asiacrypt 2009.
- Keywords
- computational syndrome decodinginformation set decodinggeneralized birthday algorithm
- Contact author(s)
- finiasz @ gmail com
- History
- 2009-09-01: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2009/414
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/414,
author = {Matthieu Finiasz and Nicolas Sendrier},
title = {Security Bounds for the Design of Code-based Cryptosystems},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/414},
year = {2009},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/414}
}
