Paper 2009/315

Breaking RSA-based PIN Encryption with thirty ciphertext validity queries

N. P. Smart

Abstract

We show that one can recover the PIN from a standardised RSA-based PIN encryption algorithm from a small number of queries to a ciphertext validity checking oracle. The validity checking oracle required is rather special and we discuss whether such oracles could be obtained in the real world. Our method works using a minor extension to the ideas of Bleichenbacher and Manger, in particular we obtain information from negative, as well as positive, responses from the validity checking oracle.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Contact author(s)
nigel @ cs bris ac uk
History
2009-07-01: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2009/315
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/315,
      author = {N. P.  Smart},
      title = {Breaking RSA-based PIN Encryption with thirty ciphertext validity queries},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2009/315},
      year = {2009},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/315}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/315}
}
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