Breaking RSA-based PIN Encryption with thirty ciphertext validity queries

N. P.  Smart

Paper 2009/315

Breaking RSA-based PIN Encryption with thirty ciphertext validity queries

N. P. Smart

Abstract

We show that one can recover the PIN from a standardised RSA-based PIN encryption algorithm from a small number of queries to a ciphertext validity checking oracle. The validity checking oracle required is rather special and we discuss whether such oracles could be obtained in the real world. Our method works using a minor extension to the ideas of Bleichenbacher and Manger, in particular we obtain information from negative, as well as positive, responses from the validity checking oracle.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Contact author(s): nigel @ cs bris ac uk
History: 2009-07-01: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2009/315
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/315,
      author = {N. P.  Smart},
      title = {Breaking {RSA}-based {PIN} Encryption with thirty ciphertext validity queries},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/315},
      year = {2009},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/315}
}