### Leakage-Resilient Signatures

Sebastian Faust, Eike Kiltz, Krzysztof Pietrzak, and Guy Rothblum

##### Abstract

The strongest standard security notion for digital signature schemes is unforgeability under chosen message attacks. In practice, however, this notion can be insufficient due to side-channel attacks'' which exploit leakage of information about the secret internal state of the scheme's hardware implementation. In this work we put forward the notion of leakage-resilient signatures,'' which strengthens the standard security notion by giving the adversary the additional power to learn a bounded amount of arbitrary information about the secret state that was accessed during every signature generation. This notion naturally implies security against all possible side-channel attacks as long as the amount of information leaked on each invocation is bounded and only computation leaks information.'' The main result of this paper is a construction which gives a (tree based, stateful) leakage-resilient signature scheme based on any 3-time signature scheme. The amount of information that our scheme can safely leak per signature generation is $1/3$ of the information the underlying 3-time signature scheme can leak in total. Based on recent works by Alwen, Dodis, Wichs and by Katz we give several efficient instantiations of 3-time signature schemes with the required security properties, hence yielding the first constructions of provably secure leakage-resilient signature schemes.

Available format(s)
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
signaturesleakage-resilience
Contact author(s)
sebastian faust @ esat kuleuven be
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2009/282

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/282,
author = {Sebastian Faust and Eike Kiltz and Krzysztof Pietrzak and Guy Rothblum},
title = {Leakage-Resilient Signatures},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2009/282},
year = {2009},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/282}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/282}
}

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