Paper 2009/277

On the Foundations of Physical Unclonable Functions

Ulrich Rührmair, Jan Sölter, and Frank Sehnke

Abstract

We investigate the foundations of Physical Unclonable Functions from several perspectives. Firstly, we discuss formal and conceptual issues in the various current definitions of PUFs. As we argue, they have the effect that many PUF candidates formally meet no existing definition. Next, we present alternative definitions and a new formalism. It avoids asymptotic concepts like polynomial time, but is based on concrete time bounds and on the concept of a security experiment. The formalism splits the notion of a PUF into two new notions, Strong $t$-PUFs and Obfuscating $t$-PUFs. Then, we provide a comparative analysis between the existing definitions and our new notions, by classifying existing PUF implementations with respect to them. In this process, we use several new and unpublished machine learning results. The outcome of this comparative classification is that our definitions seem to match the current PUF landscape well, perhaps better than previous definitions. Finally, we analyze the security and practicality features of Strong and Obfuscating $t$-PUFs in concrete applications, obtaining further justification for the split into two notions.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Physical Unclonable FunctionsFoundations of CryptographyMachine Learning
Contact author(s)
ruehrmai @ in tum de
History
2009-06-11: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2009/277
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/277,
      author = {Ulrich Rührmair and Jan Sölter and Frank Sehnke},
      title = {On the Foundations of Physical Unclonable Functions},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2009/277},
      year = {2009},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/277}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/277}
}
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