Paper 2009/219

Strongly Secure Certificateless Key Agreement

Georg Lippold, Colin Boyd, and Juan González Nieto

Abstract

We introduce a formal model for certificateless authenticated key exchange (CL-AKE) protocols. Contrary to what might be expected, we show that the natural combination of an ID-based AKE protocol with a public key based AKE protocol cannot provide strong security. We provide the first one-round CL-AKE scheme proven secure in the random oracle model. We introduce two variants of the Diffie-Hellman trapdoor introduced by \cite{DBLP:conf/eurocrypt/CashKS08}. The proposed key agreement scheme is secure as long as each party has at least one uncompromised secret. Thus, our scheme is secure even if the key generation centre learns the ephemeral secrets of both parties.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Pairing 2009 accepted paper
Keywords
public key cryptographykey exchangecertificatelesskey agreementrandom oracle modeleCKBilinear Diffie-Hellman Trapdoorproof
Contact author(s)
g lippold @ qut edu au
History
2010-07-27: last of 5 revisions
2009-05-26: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2009/219
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/219,
      author = {Georg Lippold and Colin Boyd and Juan González Nieto},
      title = {Strongly Secure Certificateless Key Agreement},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2009/219},
      year = {2009},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/219}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/219}
}
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