Paper 2009/098

Attacking Cryptographic Schemes Based on "Perturbation Polynomials"

Martin Albrecht, Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi, and Jonathan Katz


We show attacks on several cryptographic schemes that have recently been proposed for achieving various security goals in sensor networks. Roughly speaking, these schemes all use "perturbation polynomials" to add "noise" to polynomial-based systems that offer information-theoretic security, in an attempt to increase the resilience threshold while maintaining efficiency. We show that the heuristic security arguments given for these modified schemes do not hold, and that they can be completely broken once we allow even a slight extension of the parameters beyond those achieved by the underlying information-theoretic schemes. Our attacks apply to the key predistribution scheme of Zhang et al. (MobiHoc~2007), the access-control schemes of Subramanian et al. (PerCom~2007), and the authentication schemes of Zhang et~al. (INFOCOM~2008).

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
cryptanalysislattice techniqueskey pre-distribution
Contact author(s)
shaih @ alum mit edu
2009-03-02: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Martin Albrecht and Craig Gentry and Shai Halevi and Jonathan Katz},
      title = {Attacking Cryptographic Schemes Based on "Perturbation Polynomials"},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2009/098},
      year = {2009},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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