Paper 2009/095

Enhanced Privacy ID from Bilinear Pairing

Ernie Brickell and Jiangtao Li

Abstract

Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) is a cryptographic scheme that enables the remote authentication of a hardware device while preserving the privacy of the device. EPID can be seen as a direct anonymous attestation scheme with enhanced revocation capabilities. In EPID, a device can be revoked if the private key embedded in the hardware device has been extracted and published widely so that the revocation manager finds the corrupted private key. In addition, the revocation manager can revoke a device based on the signatures the device has signed, if the private key of the device is not known. In this paper, we introduce a new security notion of EPID including the formal definitions of anonymity and unforgeability with revocation. We also give a construction of an EPID scheme from bilinear pairing. Our EPID scheme is efficient and provably secure in the random oracle model under the strong Diffie-Hellman assumption and the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
AnonymityPrivacyCryptographic ProtocolsTrusted ComputingDirect Anonymous AttestationBilinear Pairing
Contact author(s)
jiangtao li @ intel com
History
2009-03-02: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2009/095
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/095,
      author = {Ernie Brickell and Jiangtao Li},
      title = {Enhanced Privacy {ID} from Bilinear Pairing},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/095},
      year = {2009},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/095}
}
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