Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2009/082

The Case for Quantum Key Distribution

Douglas Stebila and Michele Mosca and Norbert Lütkenhaus

Abstract: Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises secure key agreement by using quantum mechanical systems. We argue that QKD will be an important part of future cryptographic infrastructures. It can provide long-term confidentiality for encrypted information without reliance on computational assumptions. Although QKD still requires authentication to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks, it can make use of either information-theoretically secure symmetric key authentication or computationally secure public key authentication: even when using public key authentication, we argue that QKD still offers stronger security than classical key agreement.

Category / Keywords: quantum cryptography

Publication Info: QuantumComm 2009 Workshop on Quantum and Classical Information Security

Date: received 16 Feb 2009, last revised 1 Dec 2009

Contact author: douglas at stebila ca

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: version 2 - minor textual revisions

Version: 20091202:050640 (All versions of this report)

Short URL:

[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]